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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CALVIN H. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
CORNWALL WAREHOUSE 
COM·P ANY and 
ERNEST JAME'S, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPE·LLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 
10176 
ST~TEMEN'T OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
This is an action for personal injuries and 
property damage arising from an intersection col-
lision at Second South and Third West in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court made and entered judgment in 
favor of Calvin H. Johnson and against the Defen-
dants-Appellants and denied the Motion for a New 
Trial of the Defendants-Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants want the following: 
A. The judgment entered in favor of the 
Plaintiff-Respondent on April 28, 1964 vacated, 
1 
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B. The Lower Court directed to grant the De 
fendants-Appellants' Motion for a New Trial. 
STA'TE,MEN'T OF MA:TERIAL FACTS 
This case has been tried twice, and previously 
in Case No. 99,21 this dispute was before this Court. 
,The accident happened at about 4 :45 P.M. on 
May 31, 19'6'2 (R. 4128) at the intersec'tion of Second 
'South and 'Third West in Salt Lake City, Utah (Ex-
hibit 2D'l). The streets at this intersection are level 
(Exhibit '21D1). Visibility was not obstructed, and 
Mr. Johnson testified there was no obstruction to 
seeing Mr. James' truck or any other vehicle going 
south on ,Third West (R. 506). At the time of the 
accident, Mr. Johnson was driving his vehicle in an 
easterly direction on Second South (R. 504) at a 
speed of '20 to '25 m. p.m. ( R. 505). He was using 
the inside eastbound lane ( R. 505), and there was 
no traffic to his right in the outside eastbound lane 
(R. 505). There were no poles on the northwest 
corner df the intersection or no cars that blocked 
Mr. Johnson's vision or that would obstruct his 
a;bility to see Mr. James' truck (R. 506). 
At the intersection of Second South and 'Third 
West, Second South Street is 92 feet wide, and Third 
West is H2 feet wide (Exhibit 2D1). Officer Nich-
olson found the point of impact to he 77' 10" east 
of the west curb of Second Sou'th (Exhibit 2'DI1) 
and 5'6' 2" south of the north curb of Second South 
(Exhibit '2D'l). 
Mr. Johnson testified (R. 511) that his car, 
2 
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when he first observed the truck stopped at the stop 
sign, or wherever it was stopped, was some 150 to 
200 feet west of the west curb of Third West. Offi-
cer Nicholson testified that Mr. Johnson told h'im 
he did not see the truck again until he was in the 
intersection and at a time when he, Mr. Johnson, 
was three quarters of the way across it. At that 
time ( R. 4115) the truck was only three feet from 
the side of Mr. Johnson's car, and he had no time 
to take any evasive action ('R. 415). 
Mr. James entered the intersection from the 
north. He was driving a Chevrolet truck and stop-
ped before entering the intersection (R. 429). On 
Exhibit 2Dl (R. 480), Mr. James drew a symbol of 
the truck to show where he stopped, with the front 
of his truck north of the pedestrian lane. Mr. James 
waited at the intersection three or four minutes 
(R. 432) durin'g heavy traffic. His truck was the 
only truck there (R. 432), and before entering the 
intersection, he allowed six or seven westbound cars 
to pass across the intersection and five or six east-
bound cars (R. 432) Mr. James saw Mr. Johnson's 
car before entering, and at that time it was back 
of the fifth set of tracks shown on Exhibit 2·D 1. 
He marked his initials (E'J) to indicate the point 
on the diagram (Exhibit 2D 1) to _show the loca-
tion of Mr. Johnson's car. where he noticed it prior 
to entering the intersection. From the time Mr. 
James saw Mr. Johnson's car where the in'itials 
(EJ) are marked on Exhibit 2D1 until the time of 
3 
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the impaet, he did not see it again (R. 4'34). Mr. 
James accelerated from the time he left the spot 
where his truck was stopped to the time of the im-
pact and stated his speed was about 10 m.p.h. at 
the time of the impact ( R. 4'3'6) . 
Exhibit 2Dl also in red shows the position of 
the vehicles after the collision. 
The trial court gave ·50 instructions to the jury 
(R. 312'5- 'R. 375), inclusive. 
With respect to right-of-way the court in In-
struction 27, ( R. 3'5'3), instructed the jury as fol-
lows: 
INSTR'UGTION No. 27 
'''The Laws of the State of Utah provide 
that where a driver has driven past a stop 
sign into an intersection and a collision oc-
curs, the collision shall he deemed prima facie 
evidence of the failure to yield the right of 
way on the part of the driver passing the stop 
sign but shall not be considered negligence per 
se in determining legal liability for such acci-
dent." 
Additionally, the court gave Instruction No. 28, 
('R. 354) which reads as follows: 
INSTRUCTION No. 28 
''The terms, 'prima facie evidence of fail-
ure to yield the right of way,' and, 'negli-
gence per se,' contained in the foregoing sta-
tute need clarification as they relate to this 
accident. The term, 'prima facie,' means, on 
the face of it; so far as can be judged from 
the first disclosure; or, presumably. 'The term, 
4 
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'per se,' means, in itself; taking it alone · or 
unconnected with other rna tters. ' ' 
"As applied to this case, you must find 
nnde1· t~~ sta_tute .read to.yo'lt .that the fact of 
the c~lhst?n 1s pr1~ facte evzdence of defen-
dants fatlure. to yteld the .right of tcay and, 
hen_ce, ot neghg.ence on thetr par:t. This prima 
facie evidence Is a form of evidence and if 
there is none other tending to overcome it; or 
if this evidence of failure to yield the right 
of way preponderates over contrary evidence, 
it would require a finding of failure to yield 
the right of way on the part of defendants 
and, hence, a finding of negligence on their 
part and would require a verdict for the plain-
tiff, unless you also 'found that such negli-
gence, though existing, was not the proximate 
cause of the accident or that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligent as I have defined 
those terms to you." '(emphasis added) 
The Defendants excepted and objected to In-
structions 127 and ·28. ( R. 568-569). 
In arguing the case to the jury in the closing 
argument, Mr. Hunt stated with respect to right 
of way (R. 5'57). 
"In other words, if when the truck en-
tered Johnson was so close that he was a haz-
ard then of course, we know that the truck dri~er w~s negligent. And I'm going to ask 
you, when you go in the jury room, to read 
"2·7" through "31" becau.se there's la~guage 
in there that hits the crucial part of this case. 
Twenty-seven says, 'The laws of Utah pro-
vide that where a driver has driven past the 
stop sign -' that's the stop sign that the 
5 
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truck driver did- 'into an intersection and 
a collision occurs,' which he did, 'the collision 
shall be deemed prima facie evidence of fail-
ure to yield the right of way on the part of 
the driver passing the stop si'gn, but shall 
not be considered negligence per se in deter-
mining legal liability for such accident. 
"'Tn other words, the fact of the accident 
is evidence, as later instructions tell you, of 
the failure to yield on the part of the driver. 
And so until and unless they overcome that 
presumption, we are only left with the pro-
position of deciding what should be awarded 
Mr. Johnson." 
Again in the closing argument (R. '560), Mr. 
Hunt again emphasized the importance of Instruc-
tions 27 and 2'8, and argued that in view of the in-
structions, Johnson had the right to assume the de-
fendants' truck entering the intersection, whether 
stopped or moving, would yield to Johnson because 
Mr. James came from a stop si'gn . 
.NRGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DOWER 'COURT ERRED PRE~UTII'CIADLY 
IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE LAW R'ELAT-
ING TO RIGHT OF WAY. 
Instructions 27 and 28 which the Lower Court 
gave had the effect of directing right of way in fa-
vor of the plaintiff. The defendants objected to In-
structions 27 and 28 upon the ground they ·contain-
ed erroneous statements of the law and were high-
ly pre'judicial ( R. 568). Instructions '2·7 and 28 were 
plaintiff's requests (R. 287-'288). 
6 
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Section 41-6-74 Utah Code Annotated as amend-
-ed in 1961 reads as follows: 
41-6-74. Vehicle entering a through high-
way. - (a) '''The driver of a vehicle shall 
stop as required by this act at the entrance 
to a through highway and shall yield the right 
of way to other vehicles which have entered 
the intersection from said through highway 
or which are approaching so closely on said 
through highway as to constitute an imme-
diate hazard but said driver having so yielded 
may proceed and the drivers of all other ve-
hicles approaching the intersection on said 
through highway shall yield the right of way 
to the vehicle so proceeding into or across the 
through highway. (Emphasis added) 
('b) The driver of a vehicle shall like-
wise stop in obedience to a stop sign as re-
quired herein at an intersection where a stop 
sign is erected at one or more entrances there-
to although not a part of a through highway 
and shall proceed cautiously, yield right of 
way to vehicles not so obliged to stop which 
are within the intersection or approach'ing 
so closely as to constitute an immediate ha-
zard, but may then proceed.'' 
Paragraph (a) of Section 41-6-74.10 reads 
as follows: 
"' (a) In the event that a driver, after 
having driven past a yield sign or a stop sign, 
is involved in a collision with a pedestrian 
having right of way in a crosswa}k or a ~c­
hicle having right of way in the tn_tersectt~n 
such collision shall be deemed pnma facte 
evidence of his failure to yield the right of 
7 
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~vay as required by this section, but shall not 
be considered negligence 'per se in determining 
legal liability for such accident." (Emphasis 
added) 
INSTRU10TION No. 27 ('R. 353) 
"The Laws of the State of Utah provide 
that where a driver has driven past a stop 
sign into an intersection and a collision oc-
curs, the collision shall be deemed prim,a facie 
evidence of the failure to yield the right of 
way on the part of the driv,er passing the stop 
sign but shall not be considered negligence 
per se in determining legal liabil'ity :for such 
aeciden t." (error emphasized) 
INSTRUCTION No. '28 (R. 354) 
'~The terms, 'prima fa~cie evidence of fail-
ure to yield the right of way,' and, 'n~gligence 
per se,' contained in the foregoing statute 
need clarification as they relate to this acci-
dent. The term, 'prima facie,' means, on the 
face of it; so far as can be judged from the 
first disclosure; or, presum·ably. 'The term, 
'per se,' means, in itself; taking it alone; or, 
unconnected with other matters. 
"As applied to this case, you must find 
under the statute read to you that the fact of 
the collision is prima fiacie evidence of defend-
ants' failure to yield the right of way and, 
hence, of negligence on their part. This prima 
facie evidence is a form of evidence and, if 
there is none other tending to overcome it, 
or if this evidence of failure to yield the right 
of way preponderates over contrary evidence, 
it would require a finding of failure to yield 
the right of way on the part of defendants 
and, hence, a finding of negligence on their 
8 
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part and would require a verdict for the plain-
tiff, unless you also found that such negli-
gence, though existing, was not the proximate 
cause of the accident or that plaintiff was 
contributorily negligence as I have defined 
those terms to you." (Emphasis added) 
On the last appeal in this same case, the de-
fendants complained about the 1Lower Court giving 
Instruction ·9-'L ( R. 51) . Instruction 9-L was as 
foHows: 
'~The entry of the defendants into a high-
way controlled by a stop sign and his being 
involved in a collision in the intersection, in 
this case, is prima facie evidence that plain-
tiff had 'the right-of-way. 
'''We mean by 'prima facie' that on the 
face of it, the plaintiff had the right-of-way. 
'~If you have in addition to the defendant 
entering the con trolled highway, and being 
involved in a collision, additional evidence on 
the subject of negligence in failing to yield 
the right-of-way, you may find that plaintiif 
had a right-of-way, and in that event, your 
answer would be 'False' on No. 1 tb). But 
of you have addi tiona! evidence that over-
comes the prima facie evidence, then you are 
instructed to find "True" on Proposition No. 
1 (b). 
'The Green Sheet in Case No. 99'21 (R. 2'73-274) 
gives this court's opinion on the first appeal. In 
respect to whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negHgence, the court said: 
'CiDefendants contend that even though 
this court should conclude that under the facts 
9 
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of this case plaintiff's contributory negligence 
was a jury question, nevertheless the jury's 
verdict should not be reinstated because the 
court prejudicially erred in two of its instruc-
tions. We agree. 
"'The court instructed the jury that de-
fendant truck driver after stopping at the 
stop sign proceeded into the intersection to 
make a left-hand turn without keeping a prop-
er lookout for traffic in the position of plain-
tiff and at a time when it was not safe to 
enter and therefore the court found as a mat-
ter of law that defendant was negligent. De-
fendant driver had testified that he saw plain-
tiff's car crossing the railroad tracks as he 
started to enter the intersection to make his 
left turn at which time he estimated the car 
to be about 200, 150 or 100 feet from the west 
curb of Second South and 'Third West Streets 
and judged that he had plenty of time to 
safely enter and make his turn. In view of 
the discrepancies in the evidence as to how 
far west of the intersection plaintiff's car 
was at the time defendant driver entered the 
intersection, it was a fact which the jury 
should have determined whether defendant 
driver proceeded into the intersection without 
keeping a proper lookout and at a time it 
was not safe to enter. 
~~under the provisions of Sec. 4~-6-74.10, 
it is deemed prima facie evidence of failure 
to yield the right of way f.or a driver who has 
driven past a 'yield' or 'stop' sign and collides 
with a car having a right of way in an inteY-
section. The court instructed the jury that 
the entry of the defendnnt driver 'into a high-
way controlled by a stop sign and his being 
10 
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involved in a collision in the intersection, in 
this case, is prima facie evidence that plain-
tiff had the right of way ... ' This instruc-
tion is e1-ron eous because it assumes that be-
cause plaintiff's entance into the intersec-
tion was from a street not regulated by a stop 
sign whereas the defendants' vehicle w.as 
from such a street, the plaintiff had the right 
of way. As we have shown above the evidence 
in this case is not such as to warrant a find-
ing as a matter of law as to which driver had 
the right of way. Whether plaintiff was or 
was not in the intersection or so close thereto 
as to constitute an immediate hazard to de-
fendant's entering or proceeding into the in-
tersection was one ror determination by the 
jury. If a jury should find that plaintiff was 
not in the intersection or so close thereto as 
to constitute an immediate hazard when de-
fendants' vehicle entered the intersection, 
then plaintiff would not have the right of 
way and the collision therein could not be 
deemed prima facie evidence of defendants' 
failure to yield to such right of way." (em-
phasis added) 
Just as Instruction 9-L at the first trial was an 
erroneous statement of the law, Instruction 2'7 was 
an erroneous statement of the law at the second 
trial, as 1nstruction 27 assumed under the facts 
the plaintirf had the right of way. Further. Instruc-
tion 28 in effect directed right of way in favor of 
the plaintiff, as tha't instruction told the jury the 
fact of a collision is prima facie evidence of de-
fendant's failure to yield the right of way, and, 
hence, of negligence on their part. 
11 
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In Bates vs. Burns (19155) 3 Utah 180, 281 
P.'2d 290, where the evidence showed the plaintiff 
stopped at a stop sign 125 feet south of the point of 
impact and then proceeded northerly into the inter-
section, and thereafter collided with a westbound 
vehicle on Highway 9'1 at the intersection of High-
way 114 in Pleasant ~Grove, 'Utah, and where the 
evidence showed the plaintiff proceeded at :a speed 
of 5 to 6 m.p.h. from the stop sign to the center of 
the highway, and where in fact the plaintiff not 
only entered the intersection first but had nearly 
passed over it before the defendant entered, the 
court said the plaintiff was the disfavored driver 
until he had entered the intersection at a time when 
no car on the through highway had entered or was 
so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, but 
having entered as authorized, he be·came the favored 
driver, and all other vehicles approaching the inter-
section on said through highway were obliged to 
yield the right-of-way to him. 
At the second trial the evidence was substan-
tially the same as at the first trial. It is undisputed 
that Mr. James, before entering the intersection, 
made a complete stop and that he waited at the stop 
sign north of the pedestrian lane with six or seven 
cars going one direction and five or six the other 
direction. Mr. James started from ''0" and stated 
his speed could have been no more than 10 m.p.h. 
at the time of the impact. Exhibit '2,D1 shows that 
it is a distance in excess of 80 feet from the place 
12 
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where the front of Mr. James' truck stopped to the 
point of the im·pact. At an average speed of 5 m.p.h., 
his vehicle was going 7. 3'5 feet per second, and it 
would have taken the truck slightly more than 10 
seconds from the time it started ahead until it 
reached the point of impact, which was 77' 10" east 
of the west curb of Third West, and 56¥2 feet south 
of the north curb of Second South. 
Mr. Johnson's speed going east on Second South 
was from 20 to 2'5 m.p.h. At '2'5 m.p.h. his vehicle 
was going '36. 75 feet per second, or in ten seconds 
at that time, his vehicle would have travelled '367¥2 
feet to reach the paint of 'Collision. Even if you as-
sume the speed of Mr. Johnson's vehicle was only 
20 m.p.h., his vehicle would have been going 29.4 
feet per second and would have been '294 feet from 
the point of impact at the time the defendants' 
truck proceeded into the intersection. 
Obviously, under these :£acts, the plain tiff did 
not have the right of way as a matter of law, and 
hence, the giving of Instructions 27 and 28 were 
prejudicial depriving the defendants of their right 
to prove the plaintiff was contributorily negligent 
in failing to yield the right of way. Further, In-
structions 27 and 28 were preijudicial in that they 
relieved the plain tiff of any burden of proving he 
had the right of way in making a case. 
13 
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POINT II. 
CORRECT INSTRUCTIONS CANNOT CURE ER-
RONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS. 
A correct instruction does not cure an erron-
eous one. 'This proposition would not he important 
except based on the proposition that instructions 
are considered as a whole, sometimes the giving of 
an incorrect instruction is defended upon the theory 
that some other instructions will correct the error. 
Admittedly, in this case, 'Correct instructions 
on rrght of way were given by the court, but these 
instructions did not have the effect of nullifying 
the erroneous prejudicial effect of Instructions 27 
and 28. Where instructions are incorrect, the jury 
is at liberty to follow either the erroneous or the 
correct instruction. 
In Francis vs. City and County of San Fran-
cisco (1955) 44 C;2d 335, 282 P.'2d 49'6, the Calif-
ornia Supreme Court said: 
"Giving of an erroneous instruction is 
not cured by giving of other 'Correct instruc-
tions where the effect is simply to produce 
a clear conflict in instructions and it is not 
possible to know which instruction was fol-
lowed by the jury in arriving at its verdict.') 
In N~eilson vs. Bowles ( 1'951) 124 Colo. 274, 
236 P.2d '286, the Colorado Supreme Court said on 
ap1peal it will be considered that the jury assumed 
that all instructions were correct and that they felt 
at liberty to roll ow either a correct or an incorrect 
instruction. 
14 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Further, in Pettingell vs. Moede (1954) 129 
Colo. 484, 271 P.2d 1038, the Colorado court said 
in respect to inconsistent instructions, one of which 
was correct and the other of which was erroneous: 
"* * * A jury is to regard all court instruc-
tions .and consider them together, and it was 
so advised in the instant case; but even a cor-
rect instruction cannot cure an erroneous one. 
Where it is impossible to determine which line 
of reasoning a jury adopted, it likewise is im-
proper to speculate that it selected the correct 
theory and disregarded a wrong one." 
In Lucas vs. Kirk ('19'6·3) ____ Ala.____ 151 So. 
2d 744, the Supreme Court of Al:abama said a charge 
which is a misstatement of the law must of neces-
sity be reversible error even when construed in light 
of other charges given at appellant's request on 
oral charge to the jury. 
In Jeronimo vs. Hagerman (1963) 93 Ariz. 
357, 3'80 P.'2d 1013, the Arizona Court adopted the 
proposition that an unequivocal erroneous instruc-
tion was not cured by the mere giving of a correct 
instruction concerning the same subject matter else-
where in the charge. 
Instruction 28 given by the ·court was binding 
in its effect in that the jury was told you must 
find under the statute read you that the fact of the 
collision is prima facie evidence of the defendant's 
failure to yield the right of way and hence, and of 
negligence on their part. Generally speaking, bind-
ing instructions of a formula nature are more pre-
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judicial if erroneous than non-binding, non-formula 
instructions. 
In LeVine vs. Headlee, Jr. (19'64) ____ w. Va ____ _ 
13'4 'S.E.'2d 892, the court said a binding instruc-
tion must be complete in itself, and any omission 
from its language cannot be cured by reference 
to other instructions given. 
In Charvoz vs. Bonneville Irr. Dist. (1951) 
t20 Utah 4'80, 2:35 P.2d 780, where an erroneous 
instruction was given to the effect the plaintiff 
could not recover from a loss arising from a break 
in an irrigation canal unless the break was solely 
caused by the defendant's negligence, and where it 
was well settled law that the defendant would be 
liable if his negligence concurred with an act O:f ·God 
or negligence of a stranger, and where it was claim-
ed on .appeal the error was cured by a proper in-
struction and proximate cause, this court said: 
~'Assuming that this instruction may be 
unobjectionable in a proper case, we cannot 
agree that it cured the quite erroneous in-
struction preceding it. The instruction lays 
particular emphasis on persons and makes no 
reference to an act of God. Such instruction, 
even if construed as one treating concurrency 
of causes, is inconsistent so completely as to 
substitute confusion for clarity, lend doubt 
as to where responsibility could or should be 
reposed, and adds to the error already com-
mitted. We believe the trial court erred in 
failing to give a proper and understandable 
instruction on concurring causes." 
In Instructions 27 and '28 the trial ·court told 
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the jury that Mr. Johnson had only to get involved 
in a collision to have the right of way, and this ob-
viously confused the jury as to what the law on 
right of way was or should be, and left the jury at 
liberty to select the instruction on right of way 
which it might wish to follow. Further, in his clos-
ing argument, Mr. Hunt admonished the jury that 
the crucial point of the case could be decided from 
reading Instructions 217 to 3'1, and thus, emphasized 
the erroneous instructions. 
POTNT III. 
THE P'R1IOR DECI1SI·ON CONSTITUTES THE TJAW 
OF THE C~SE. 
At the retrial, the case was retried on the same 
pleadings and the evidence was substantially the 
same. No new issues were introduced, and no new 
witnesses were called on the factual question, al-
though the plain tiff called 1an addi tiona! medical 
witness. 
The general rule is that where an appellate 
court in a prior opinion states the rule or principle 
of law which is directly raised on such appeal and 
is necessary :for its decision, the rule as stated in 
the prior opinion must be adhered to and followed 
throughout all subsequent proceedings, by the trial 
court, appellate court, and the parties involved. 
In the prior opinion in Case No. ~9'9'2'1, this 
court said it was a jury question as to right of way, 
and the fact a collision occurred did not mean the 
17 
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plaintif had the right of way. In fact, the court said 
that Instruction 9-L on the prior appeal, which is 
substantially the same as Instruction 27, was an 
erroneous statement of the law, and that the ques-
tion of right of way should be submitted to the jury. 
In effect, at the retrial, the trial court refused to 
follow the opinion of the Supreme Court and permit 
the jury to find whether or not Mr. Johnson's ve-
hicle was so close as to constitute an immediate 
hazard at the time the defendants' truck entered 
the intersection. 
In Chipman vs. Amerioan Fork City (1'919) 54 
Utah 93, '1'7'9 P. 742 in which the court on a second 
. appeal found the pleadings and evidence substan-
tially the same as that on a first trial and appeal, 
~and that the trial judge at the second trial had 
correctly instructed the jury in conformance with 
the prior ruling on appeal, the court held the prior 
ruling on appeal constituted the law of the case, 
and said that it was immaterial what view the 
Supreme Court took on the question of liability on 
the second appeal, as the opinion on the first ap-
··peal was binding. 
[In Helper State Bank vs. Crus. (19'38) '9'5 Utah 
3·20, 81 P.'2d 3'5~9, the court said ·a previous rulin~ 
of the reviewing court upon a point distinctly made 
is binding on the court on a second appeal and that 
where questions of fact and law are the same, the 
decision of the first appeal, whether right or wrong, 
becomes the law of the case, and on. appeal is bind-
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ing as well on the parties to the action, the trial 
court, and the appellate court. To the same effect 
is Forbes vs. Butler (19128) 73 Utah 52'2, 275 P. 7'72. 
In Petty vs. Clark (1948) 113 Utah 205, 192 
P.2d 589, where on a second trial the case was re-
tried by a different trial judge, the court said on 
the second appeal: 
"Under the law of the case doctrine, it 
is usually held that where ~an appellate court 
in its opinion states a rule or principle of law 
which is directly raised on such appeal and is 
necessary for its decision, that rule or prin-
ciple must be adhered to and followed through-
out 1all subsequent proceedings in such ·case, 
both in trial court and in a subsequent ap-
peal even though the court may believe that 
it would have been better to have decided the 
question differently." 
At the second trial the evidence on liability was 
substantially the same, and the pleadings were the 
same. Further, Instructions 27 and 28 were sub-
stantially the same as Instruction 9-L, in that they 
contained an erroneous statement of the law. It 
follows that ~at the second trial the Lower Court 
prejudicially erred in giving Instructions 2·7 and 28, 
and did not follow the opinion of the Supreme Court, 
which constituted the law of the case. 
CONIOL USJON 
The defendants should be granted a new trial. 
1. 1The question of right of way depends upon 
whether or not the plaintiff's vehicle was so close 
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as to constitute an immediate hazard at the time 
the defendants' truck entered the intersection. 
2. The plaintiff wrongfully assumed in re-
questing instructions, and the Lower Court wrong-
fully instructed the jury to the effect the plaintiff 
had the right of way because the plain tiff was on 
an arterial street. 
The judgment of the Lower Court should be 
reversed because: 
1. 'The Lower Court committed error preju-
dicial to the defendants in instructing the jury that 
the laws of the State of Utah provide where a 
driver has driven past a stop sign into an inter-
section and ,a collision occurs, the collision shall be 
deemed prima facie evidence of failure to yield the 
right of way on the part of the driver passing the 
stop sign. 
2. The correct instructions on right of way 
did not cure the erroneous statements on right of 
way in Instructions 27 and 28, ·as the jury was at 
Iiberty to follow either instruction. 
3. As the facts and pleadings were substan-
tially the same, the Lower Court· was bound .at the 
second trial to submit the question of which driver 
had the right of ·way to the jury under a proper 
instruction, and bound not to direct the jury that 
the fact the defendant had driven past a st?P sign 
into an intersection and had a collision was prima 
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facie evidence of the defendant's failure to yield 
the right of way. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND M. BERRY, 
Attorney for the 
Defendants-Appellants 
203 Executive Building 
455 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
I hereby certify that on this ---------------- day of 
August, 19'64, I mailed two copies of this Brief by 
United States mail, postage prepaid, to Gayle Dean 
Hunt, and two copies to Dwight L. King at the 
addresses shown on this Brief. 
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